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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
TORTS-TELEVISING OF PROFESSIONAL ACT NOT A VIOLATION OF
CIVIL RGHTS LAW
Plaintiff, while performing with his animal act between the halves of a foot-
ball game, was televised on a sponsored program without his consent. He brought
action alleging that the defendants, without authorization, used his name and
picture for advertising purposes and purposes of trade in violation of Section 51
of the Civil Rights Law of New York. Section 51 states: "Any person whose
name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or
purposes of trade... may also sue and recover damages for any injury sustained
by reason of such use." Held: even though plaintiff protested belore his perform-
ance, he was not entitled to recover damages under the New York Civil Rights
Law. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 553 (1st
Dept. 1951). Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted, 126
N. Y. L J. 718 (Oct. 3, 1951).
Warren and Brandeis first discussed the concept of the right of privacy in
1890. They felt that there was a social need for the right to be free from un-
authorized publicity-the right "to be left alone." Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L Rev. 193 (1890). Before this concept had a chance
to be accepted the New York court was squarely faced with the right of privacy
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902),
and decided by a 4-3 decision that there was no common law right of privacy.
This has been restated by the court on numerous occasions. See, Kimmerle v.
New York Evening Journal, 262 N. Y. 99 at 102, 186 N. E. 217 at 218 (1933).
Birmingham v. Daily Mirror, 175 Misc. 372 at 373, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 549 at 550
(Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd. 261 App. Div. 838, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 998 (2d Dept. 1941).
In response to the public resentment aroused by the Roberson case, the Civil
Rights Statute was enacted. New York Laws 1903, ch. 132, Sec. 1, 2 as amended
in 1911 and 1921; now Civil Rights Law Sec. 50, 51. See, Editorial N. Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 1902.
Since its enactment the statute has received a most narrow construction for
three reasons. (1) It contains certain penal features. Binns v. Vitagraph Co.,
210 N. Y. 51 at 55, 103 N. E. 1108 at 1109 (1913); Humiston v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752 (1st Dept. 1919); Toscani v.
Hersey, 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 814 (1st Dept. 1946). (2) The
statute was enacted for the purpose of overruling the holding of the Roberson
case and as a result has been largely construed to fit the facts of that case. See,
Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L Rev. 526 at 538 (1941). (3) There
is a strong adherence to the policy protecting freedom of speech and press. If
the item is one of public interest-which may include items of current news
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or of an educational and informative nature-the publication is privileged.
Sweenek v. Pathe News Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E. D. N. Y. 1936); Colyer v.
Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999 (2d Dept. 1914);
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. S. 382 (Sup. Cr. 1937). To
the extent that the occupation or chosen profession of a plaintiff makes him a
public figure his right to privacy is not absolute but limited and narrow. Sides v.
F-R Publication Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), affd. 113 F. 2d 806
(2d Cir. 1940) certiorari denied 311 U. S. 711, 61 S. Ct. 393 (1940). Koussevitzky
v. Allen, Towne and Heath Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (Sup. Ct.
1947), af'd. 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 432 (1st Dept. 1947).
However, the statute is not always given a narrow construction. It has been
stated that since the section is largely remedial, though part penal, it should be
broadly construed in the light of its purpose of accommodating law to social needs.
Jackson v. Consumer Publications, 169 Misc. 1022, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 691 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), afd. 256 App. Div. 965, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 694 (1st Dept. 1939).
The question presented to the court was whether the picture of the plaintiff
was used merely for the dissemination of factual information or news events of
public interest, or whether it was used for advertising purposes or purposes of
trade.
In defining the term "purposes of trade" the courts have drawn certain dis-
tinctions. In the following types of cases recovery was denied: The use of
plaintiff's name and picture in a motion picture of current events, Humiston v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra; the use of a name once in a novel of almost 400
pages, Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N. Y. S. 444
(Sup. Cr. 1928), aff'd. 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N. Y. S. 773 (1st Dept. 1929);
Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. S. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1935); the por-
trayal of plaintiffs factory, on which his firm name dearly appeared, in a motion
picture dealing with the white slave traffic, Merle v. Sociological Research Film
Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S. 829 (1st Dept. -1915); the use of the
name and picture of an alleged strike breaker together with the names and likeness
of eight others on the front piece, and the mention of his name four times in 314
pages of a book dealing with strike breaking, People, on the Complaint of Steri;
v. Robert R. McBride & Co., 159 Misc. 5, 288 N. Y. S. 501 (N. Y. City Ct.
1936); the attributing of the authorship of an absurd adventure story to a well
recognized writer, D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 208 N. Y. 596, 102
N. E. 1101 (1913); and the portrayal of the plaintiff in a comic magazine as a
hero in a disaster in which plaintiff was a prominent figure, Maloney v. Boy
Comics, 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 119 (1st Dept. 1950).
It was held in Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 App. Div. 155, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 233
(1st Dept. 1950), that it was a question for the jury whether the use of a name
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and picture was informative or whether the primary purpose was to amuse the
public; that is, was it for the legitimate purpose of disseminating news or for
purposes of trade?
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra, established the" rule that im-
munity is granted to-fact as distinguished from fiction regardless of the medium
by which it is conveyed; however, all the factual situations that have been privi-
leged have been "human interest" subjects such as, scenes in a women's reducing
gymnasium, Sweenek v. Pathe News Inc., supra, expositions of Babe Ruth's
homerun technique, Ruth v. Educational Films, 194 App. Div. 893, 184 N. Y. S.
948 (1st Dept. 1920).
There are of course limits to the immunity accorded the mediums of news
dissemination. The use of a name or photograph must have some relevance to
the reporting of the news, Thompson v. Close-Up Inc., 277 App. Div. 848, 98
N. Y. S. 2d 300 (1st Dept. 1950). Where the subject matter is solely for en-
tertainment purposes and particularly, where it appears in a medium not identified
in the main with the dissemination of news, recovery will be permitted. Redmond
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N. Y. 707, 14 N. E. 2d 636 (1938); Franklin v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 246 App. Div. 35, 284 N. Y.S. 96 (1st Dept. 1935).
aNI'd. 271 N. Y. 554, 2 N. E. 2d 691 (1936).
The facts of the principal case disclose that the plaintiff's act was not tele-
vised because of its news value or because the defendants wanted to report plain-
tiff's performance as a matter of public interest, but rather, that the act was
televised as a part of and in conjunction with the advertising of defendant's
product.
It is assumed that a football game is an event of public interest; but the
plaintiff's performance of his act between the halves of the game can not be
considered an event of public interest that can be characterized as news. An
examination of the cases, where recovery was denied because of the policy of
protecting the wide dissemination of news, indicates that in each of the cases,
plaintiff's- name or picture was used, not for the purpose of advertising, but as a
factual presentation in connection with matters of news in which the public had
an interest.
Another line of reasoning that could be followed is that used in Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Pa. 1938), al-
though not dealing with the right of privacy. The court made the distinction be-
tween public news and private news. All are free to partake of the former, while
in the latter the participant has a property right. Certainly a legitimate stage
performance could not be televised without authorization, for by the telecast the
performance would lose its commercial value. The same is true of the perform-
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ance in the principal case. It would seem that the participant should be able
to control the publicity at least until the completion of the performance when
it would become a subject for news, for example, in a newspaper in a reportorial
fashion.
The television station and network as well as the sponsor did obtain some
benefit from the telecast. If the act had not been televised the time would have
had to have been filled with some other subject. The court stressed in W/itmark
v. Bamberger, 291 F. 776 (D. N. J. 1923) that a radio station is not an eleemosy-
nary institution, but is conducted for profit, and the defendant must pay for the
use of copyrighted music, even though it broadcast its slogan only at the beginning
and at the end of the program as was done in the principal case. Television is
not different from radio in this respect. Is it not true, therefore, that the tele-
vision station used the performance for the purpose of trade? See, Herbert v.
Shanley, 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232 (1917). Associated Music v. Memorial Radio
Fund, 141 F. 2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944), certiorari denied 323 U. S. 766, 65 S. Ct.
120 (1944).
It may be contended that public policy supports the principal decision. If
the contrary were held, any spectator at a sporting event would have a cause of
action if televised. However, this would not necessarily be true. Only a per-
former whose act did not constitute news would have an action. The spectators
are only incidental to the reporting of the event. The performance in itself is an
entity and nor merely incidental; and plaintiff is an independent contractor, nor
an employee of the football dub that authorized the television of the game.
Certainly, no harm can be done to extend the New York Civil Rights Law, if
there need be an extension, to cover the situation in the principal case.
Ralph L. Halpern
TORTS-OVERTHROW OF THE CHARITIES' IMMUNITY DOCTRINE-
JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE OF CHANGING PUBLIC
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Plaintiff was injured when the wheel-stretcher upon which she was riding
escaped the grasp of a nurse's aide employed by the defendant, and overturned.
The complaint charged defendant charity hospital with failure to exercise due
care in the selection of its employees. At trial, a directed verdict was given to
the defendant, and plaintiff's motion for retrial denied. Plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court of Arizona held that the question of negligence should have
gone to the jury, and, upon the plaintiff's request, reviewed the doctrine of Char-
ities' Tort Immunity, and declared the policy overruled. Ray et ux. v. Tuscon
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2nd 220 (1951).
